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INTRODUCTION
The 2017 Thrower Symposium focused on how law addresses serious
global public health challenges. One critical way the world community
addresses disease is through vaccination. The World Health Organization
(WHO) and other national health bodies strongly recommend vaccines in many
circumstances.1 Yet there is a scientific consensus that vaccines can and do
cause harm and death in certain individuals, even when vaccines are properly
manufactured and appropriately administered. So, who should bear this risk?
Of course, the individual bears all the physical risk, both of protection from
disease and potential adverse side effects. But what of the financial risk of
potential vaccine harms? Who should pay—the manufacturer, the individual,
the government, or some combination thereof?
This Article looks at current models for vaccine injury liability in the
United States and the European Union, and also focuses on possibilities for the
developing world in the future. In the United States, vaccine manufacturers
have attained an extremely high level of liability protection through legislation
and judicial interpretation. The 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
(the Vaccine Act); the 2005 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act (the PREP Act); and Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision interpreting the Vaccine Act, together afford vaccine manufacturers
almost blanket liability protection from damages for vaccine harms.2
In June 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) provided
guidance in a vaccine injury case that strikes a remarkably different balance. In
E.U. countries, an injured person has the right to seek compensation in civil
court and to allege that a vaccine is unreasonably dangerous or defective. The
ECJ held that an injured party may bring “serious, specific and consistent
evidence,” and can prevail if this evidence shows that the vaccine is “the most
plausible explanation for the occurrence of the damage.”3 The plaintiff can
assert this claim even if a scientific consensus that a vaccine can cause the
alleged injury does not yet exist.
1
See Immunization, Vaccines and Biologicals: WHO Recommendations for Routine Immunization—
Summary Tables, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.who.int/immunization/policy/
immunization_tables/en/; Recommended Vaccines by Age, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpd/vaccines-age.html (last updated Nov. 22, 2016).
2
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2012); National Childhood
Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-1 to -34 (2012); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011).
3
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=first&part=1
&cid=848112.
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While some contend that this ECJ decision opens the floodgates to
litigation, scholarly commentary disfavors this view. Empirical work indicates
that leaving courthouse doors open elevates vaccine safety. While access to
courts for vaccine injury in the United States is essentially closed, it is more
open in Europe; accordingly, the ways in which developing countries proceed
is at stake.
The U.S.-based Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and other major
intergovernmental, governmental, and private-sector actors have joined
together recently to create a vaccine fund to respond to potential epidemic
disease threats on a global basis. The new fund, the Coalition for Epidemic
Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), has stated that it seeks to create liability
protection and compensation mechanisms based on the U.S. model for vaccine
liability. CEPI’s intent to export the U.S. model warrants serious consideration
and caution.
This Article seeks to explore these different liability regimes. Part I
explores the liability protection mechanisms in the United States, including a
review of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (NVICP), the
Supreme Court’s Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC decision, and the PREP Act’s
compensation program. Part II discusses the June 2017 ECJ judgment of
liability for vaccine injury and its implications in the European Union. Part III
explores the liability standards that the new global CEPI is reviewing. This
Article concludes that the E.U. model better balances the concerns of public
health and individual rights, and thus is an important model for CEPI to
consider.
I.

THE 1986 U.S. NATIONAL CHILDHOOD VACCINE INJURY ACT

Advancements in vaccine science and the concomitant development of
vaccination policy dramatically changed public health in the United States
during the twentieth century.4 Many infectious diseases, including smallpox,
polio, diphtheria, and rubella are extremely uncommon today, at least in part
because of widespread uptake of vaccines.5 Death rates from infectious disease

4
See JAMES COLGROVE, STATE OF IMMUNITY: THE POLITICS OF VACCINATION IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 16 (2006).
5
See Gordon Shemin, Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding and What Families Should
Know Before Rushing Out of Vaccine Court, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 459, 467 (2008).
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in the United States are low.6 Many consider vaccination one of the most
significant advances in public health.7
Science suggests that vaccine efficacy is based on herd immunity. This
theory postulates that as the level of immunity within a community rises,
chains of infectious disease transmission are interrupted, eventually resulting
in elimination of those infections and their risk of harm to the public
altogether.8 The precise level of vaccination coverage necessary to achieve
herd immunity depends on the disease and is difficult to determine
empirically,9 but the imprecise theory of herd immunity guides national
immunization programs.10
The U.S. national immunization program builds on state laws that mandate
children’s vaccination prior to enrollment in daycare and preschool to prevent
the transmission of infectious diseases among children at school.11 In 1964, the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare12 chartered the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) pursuant to the Public Health
Service Act13 to support state efforts to prevent and control communicable
diseases.14 ACIP advises the states on public health and funds state vaccination
programs.15 ACIP’s charter requires it to recommend when and for whom
vaccines should be used to prevent disease.16 It also requires that ACIP decide

6
Id.; see also Mathew Herper & Robert Langreth, Fear Factor, FORBES (Sept. 27, 2007, 6:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/2007/09/26/vaccines-thimerosal-autism-biz-sci-cx_mh_rl_0927vaccines.html.
7
See Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 1900–1999, 48 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241 (1999).
8
See Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health Imperative and
Individual Rights, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 338, 340 (Richard A. Goodman et al. eds., 2d ed.
2007); Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting Out of Vaccinating
Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 419–21 (2004) (describing herd immunity); Gail Javitt et al.,
Assessing Mandatory HPV Vaccination: Who Should Call the Shots?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 384, 388 (2008)
(describing the theory of herd immunity).
9
See Malone & Hinman, supra note 8.
10
See id. at 340, 354.
11
See Javitt et al., supra note 8, at 388–89.
12
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was renamed the Department of Health and
Human Services in 1979, and its responsibilities concerning education were transferred to the newly created
Department of Education. See HHS Historical Highlights, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/historical-highlights/index.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2017).
13
42 U.S.C. § 217a(a) (2012) (“The Secretary may . . . appoint such advisory councils or
committees . . . for the purpose of advising him in connection with any of his functions.”); see also ACIP
Charter: Authority, Objective, and Description, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/committee/charter.html (last updated Apr. 20, 2016).
14
See ACIP Charter: Authority, Objective, and Description, supra note 13.
15
See id.
16
See id.
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which vaccines the federal government will subsidize for indigent children.17
By 1981, all states made vaccination a prerequisite for school attendance
unless applicable exemptions applied.18 Today, ACIP’s recommendations
guide most state public health agencies in determining which vaccines to
mandate for school entry.19
The success of the national vaccine program has come at a cost. Some
children are permanently disabled or die from their vaccine exposures.20 A
broad spectrum of suspected and confirmed adverse vaccine events has grown
in the decades from the beginning of mass vaccination.21 Although the
percentage of those who experience adverse reactions to vaccines is believed to
be small,22 thousands have been compensated for injury, and vaccine adverse
events are almost certainly underreported.23 In total, over 600,000 people in the

17
See id.; see also Vaccines for Children Program, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr.
24, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/index.html.
18
See Malone & Hinman, supra note 8, at 345 (“By the 1980–1981 school year, all 50 states had laws
covering students first entering school. In most states, these laws affected children at all grade levels, as well
as those involved in licensed preschool settings.”). State legislatures recognize three types of exemptions, all
of which can be waived in the case of a public health emergency. See Kristine M. Severyn, Jacobson v.
Massachusetts: Impact on Informed Consent and Vaccine Policy, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 249, 260 (1995). All
states recognize a medical exemption, whereby a physician certifies that the vaccine may be harmful to an
individual. Id. Forty-seven states provide religious exemptions, with varying requirements regarding
demonstrating the sincerity of one’s religious belief. States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from
School Immunization Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.
org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx. Many states also provide broader
philosophical exemptions, based on personal, philosophical, moral, or some other type of belief. Id. As of
December 2017, eighteen states had philosophical exemptions. Id. California, Mississippi, and West Virginia
are the only states that exclusively permit medical exemptions. Id.
19
See Javitt et al., supra note 8, at 389.
20
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH RES. & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY
COMPENSATION PROGRAM MONTHLY STATISTICS REPORT (2017); About VAERS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., http://vaers.hhs.gov/about/index (last visited Dec. 19, 2017); see also Regina Moreland,
Commentary, National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: The Potential Impact of Cedillo for VaccineRelated Autism Cases, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 363, 367–68 (2008).
21
See B.J. Ward, Vaccine Adverse Events in the New Millennium: Is There Reason for Concern?, 78
BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 205, 206 (2000).
22
See, e.g., Possible Side-Effects from Vaccines, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar.
10, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/side-effects.htm (stating that the diphtheria-tetanus-acellular
pertussis and measles, mumps, and rubella vaccines have severe side effects of “less than 1 out of a million
doses”).
23
As of July 5, 2017, 5,555 claims of the 16,517 that went before the NVICP have been
compensated. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH RESOURCES & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 20, at 7. For
information on why this number is likely too low, see Odds of Vaccine Harm are One in a Million?, NAT’L
VACCINE INFO. CTR. (Sept. 15, 2017, 5:56 PM), http://www.nvic.org/nvic-vaccine-news/september-2017/oddsof-vaccine-harm-are-one-in-a-million.aspx.

HOLLAND GALLEYPROOFS2

420

3/30/2018 9:35 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:415

United States have filed vaccine adverse event reports since 1990.24
Furthermore, people receive little warning of the risks of vaccination because
of minimal information requirements under the Vaccine Act.25
Between 1980 and 1986, people who claimed vaccine injury brought over
three billion dollars of damages claims to U.S. civil courts against vaccine
manufacturers.26 Although some vaccine-injured plaintiffs’ claims were
successful, most went uncompensated because of the difficulty of proving
causation in the tort system.27 Many potential plaintiffs could not afford
representation to bring their claims. Because legal costs were high and vaccine
manufacturers argued they were unable to obtain cost-effective liability
insurance, manufacturers began to leave what they asserted was an
unprofitable market.28 For example, Wyeth Laboratories temporarily halted
production of the diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) vaccine in 1984
“because of extreme liability exposure, cost of litigation and the difficulty of
continuing to obtain adequate insurance.”29 By 1985, four manufacturers
produced the primary vaccines used in state vaccination programs.30 Congress
recognized a supply crisis.31
A. Stakeholders
The parents of vaccine-injured children, scientists, vaccine manufacturers,
the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), the American Medical
Association (AMA), and Congress were all displeased with the existing
system. Tort litigation was costly, time-consuming, and usually
undercompensated or failed to compensate victims.32
24
See Search the VAERS Database, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CTR., http://www.medalerts.org/vaersdb/
index.php (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).
25
See History of Vaccine Information Statements, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 4,
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/downloads/vis-history.pdf.
26
See Shemin, supra note 5, at 469; see also Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons
from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 60 (1999).
27
See Shemin, supra note 5, at 5; see also Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product
Availability and Product Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853, 1859–60 (1995)
(explaining that vaccine litigation is difficult in the civil court system because of the inability to raise design
defect claims, the difficulty in establishing proximate cause, and the length of time it takes to litigate claims).
28
See Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to
the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 149, 152 (1988).
29
Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearings on H.R. 5810 Before the Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of
the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong. 295 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5810] (statement
of Daniel L. Shaw, Jr., M.D., Vice President for Medical Affairs, Wyeth Laboratories).
30
See Neraas, supra note 28, at 152.
31
See id. at 151–52; see also Shemin, supra note 5, at 470 n.50.
32
See H.R. REP. NO. 99–908, at 6 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6347.
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In 1977, before the crisis in childhood vaccine manufacturing, the AAP
issued a policy statement advocating the creation of a program which would
compensate those injured by compulsory vaccines.33 In the early 1980s, a
group of parents whose children were injured by the DPT vaccine formed a
non-profit called Dissatisfied Parents Together, now known as the National
Vaccine Information Center, to advocate for such a compensation program.34
In 1981, the AAP published a detailed outline of such a compensation
system.35
The parents wanted both victim compensation and safer vaccines for all
children. To that end, the parents sought a system to compensate families and
to create incentives for vaccine manufacturers to develop the safest vaccines
possible. They believed that preserving plaintiffs’ access to civil courts would
apply the pressure necessary to keep vaccine manufacturers’ practices safe.36
As Jeffrey Schwartz, President of Dissatisfied Parents Together, explained:
[We] felt from the very beginning we could not support a bill that
simply compensated children who are injured; that did not provide a
strong mandate for the creation of safer vaccines, for the use of safer
vaccines, for the implementation of a safer system for using the
current vaccine. We would not agree to sweep the problem under the
rug by paying off the families and the children who are damaged and
let this process of administering a hazardous vaccination go on
without a challenge.37

The parents said they “could not support, in fact would have to oppose,
enactment of any bill which did not guarantee a child’s option to sue under the
traditional common law principles of tort and contract.”38
Members of the scientific community joined the parents to support the
creation of a hybrid compensation system including both administrative and
tort elements. Scientists warned Congress of the dangers of eliminating tort
liability altogether, including Dr. Jonas Salk, developer of the inactivated polio
33

See COLGROVE, supra note 4, at 208.
See HARRIS L. COULTER & BARBARA LOE FISHER, A SHOT IN THE DARK: WHY THE P IN THE DPT
VACCINATION MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR CHILD’S HEALTH 213 (1991). The legal theory propounded by
the parents, that the pertussis component of the DPT vaccine was the medical cause of their children’s injuries,
was later validated by the federal courts. See, e.g., Andreu v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (allowing compensation for seizures caused by the DPT vaccine).
35
See COLGROVE, supra note 4, at 208.
36
See id.
37
National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act: Hearing on S. 2117 Before the S. Comm. on
Labor & Human Res., 98th Cong. 49 (1984) (statement of Jeffrey H. Schwartz, Dissatisfied Parents Together).
38
Id. at 59 (emphasis omitted).
34
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vaccine.39 Dr. Salk testified regarding industry indemnification, stating that he
had two serious concerns with regard to such legislation:
– One is the removal of the incentive for manufacturers and the
scientific community to improve existing vaccines . . . .
– The other is the removal of the incentive to change policy when
equally effective but safer vaccines already exist . . . .
Therefore, such legislation should provide for:
– Encouragement of research and development of vaccines free of
the untoward side effects for which indemnification is to be
provided.40

By contrast, the pharmaceutical and medical communities opposed any
liability for vaccine manufacturers, citing threats to the vaccine supply and
public health.41 Their representatives pushed for a no-fault administrative
system to be the exclusive remedy for victims. They stated:
The proposed compensation system must be the exclusive
remedy of claimants and not merely an alternative to remedies
currently available.
....
. . . Given the important goals of promoting the vaccination of
children and assuring the ready availability of vaccine to meet that
objective, legislation should be fashioned to help achieve those goals.
Permitting claimants to continue to bring tort actions against
manufacturers and providers will not achieve desired goals, in our
view, since sufficient protection is not provided from the increasingly
high expense of litigation that is driving manufacturer costs up—
costs that have been asserted as forcing companies out of vaccine
production.42

The vaccine manufacturers argued that they, “as well as vaccine recipients,
can be victims of the excesses and vagaries of the current tort system.”43 The
industry’s proposed legislation would have allowed almost no role for the tort
system. Industry representatives advocated that the only basis for a civil claim

39
40
41
42
43

See id. at 164 (statement of Jonas Salk, M.D., the Salk Inst. for Biological Studies).
Id. at 166.
See id. at 189 (statement of Dr. Alan R. Nelson, M.D., American Medical Association).
Id. at 186, 189.
Id. at 264 (statement of Richard Bogash, President, Wyeth Laboratories).
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should be when a corporation deviates from government standards in
manufacturing or a healthcare practitioner commits malpractice.44
B. The Legislative Compromise
The AAP and the industry worked closely with the members of Dissatisfied
Parents Together to draft legislation that would become the Vaccine Act.45 The
draft was completed in the House Committee on Energy and Commerce’s
(Committee) Health and Environment Subcommittee (Subcommittee), and
Jeffrey Schwartz served the Committee as Environmental Counsel from 1973
to 1979.46 As Barbara Loe Fisher, a co-founder of Dissatisfied Parents
Together47 wrote: “Parents . . . supported the concept that a federal
compensation system would result in official recognition of the reality of
vaccine deaths and injuries and would help make vaccine safety a priority in
United States health care.”48
Congress passed the Vaccine Act in October 1986, after four years of
deliberations, to balance the goals of victim injury compensation, stable
vaccine supply, and the creation of safer vaccines.49 The Committee
accompanied the Vaccine Act with House Report 9–908 (the 1986 Report),
which includes a section-by-section analysis of the Vaccine Act’s provisions
and explanation of its intentions.50 The 1986 Report evidences Congress’
purpose to generously compensate victims of vaccine injury, ensure the
vaccine supply, and improve vaccine safety.51 Congress viewed child victims
of vaccine injury as veterans in the war on disease; they deserved
compensation just like soldiers injured on the battlefield.52
Part of the Vaccine Act’s compromise is that families must file a claim in
the NVICP within three years of the first manifestation of injury.53 The
Vaccine Act requires that claimants exhaust their administrative remedies first
44

See id. at 278 (statement of John E. Lyons, President, Merck Sharp & Dohme).
See COULTER & FISHER, supra note 34, at 213–14; see also COLGROVE, supra note 4, at 214.
46
See Hearings on H.R. 5810, supra note 29, at 80 (statement of Jeffrey H. Schwartz, Dissatisfied
Parents Together).
47
See Biography, Barbara Loe Fisher, NAT’L VACCINE INFO. CTR., http://www.nvic.org/about/
barbaraloefisher.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2017).
48
COULTER & FISHER, supra note 34, at 213–14.
49
See H.R. REP. 99–908, at 1 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344.
50
Id. at 8–35, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6349–76.
51
See id. at 9–10, 20–22, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6350–51, 6361–63.
52
132 CONG. REC. 30,751, 30,760 (1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman); see also Henry A. Waxman,
When a Vaccine Injures a Child: A No-Fault Way to Compensate, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1986, at A27.
53
See National Childhood Vaccine Act, 42 U.S.C § 300aa-16(a)(2) (2012).
45
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by bringing their claims to the NVICP.54 But, at least in theory, it allows them
to exit the NVICP and bring a civil action in federal district or state court after
filing on two conditions. First, the claimant can opt out of the compensation
program if the special master fails to hand down a decision within the
statutorily prescribed period of 240 days.55 Second, the claimant may reject the
special master’s decision if she is dissatisfied with it and file a civil suit if the
Vaccine Act’s other provisions do not preempt litigation.56 So, while the
Vaccine Act circumscribes plaintiffs’ access to state and federal courts, it does
not eliminate it.57
In practice, few people turn down NVICP awards to test their luck in civil
court. Even before Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC foreclosed the opportunity to sue
for vaccine design defects,58 fewer than 0.5% of successful claimants who
received an award in the compensation program rejected it.59 “[V]irtually all”
unsuccessful claimants declined to initiate suits in civil court.60 In a recent
study of the NVICP, Stanford professor Nora Freeman Engstrom concluded
that although Congress intended the NVICP to complement the civil justice
system, in fact, “the [N]VICP typically functions as an exclusive remedy.”61
C. Preemption of Design Defect Claims
The availability of civil action for vaccine design defects was left
somewhat murky in the statute, whether by intent or oversight. The Vaccine
Act’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended that victims, who had
duly filed in the NVICP, could still bring design defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers to civil court under the Vaccine Act.62 When presenting the
Vaccine Act to the full House of Representatives for vote, Representative

54

See id. § 300aa-11(a).
See id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii).
56
See id. § 300aa-21(a); see also Nitin Shah, Note, When Injury Is Unavoidable: The Vaccine Act’s
Limited Preemption of Design Defect Claims, 96 VA. L. REV. 199, 203 (2010).
57
See § 300aa-21(a).
58
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2011) (“Provided that there was proper
manufacture and warning, any remaining side effects, including those resulting from design defects, are
deemed to have been unavoidable. State-law design-defect claims are therefore pre-empted.”).
59
Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the VICP, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 1631, 1673 (2015).
60
Id. (quoting STANLEY A. PLOTKIN ET AL., VACCINES 1673 (5th ed. 2008)).
61
Id. at 1673.
62
See § 300aa-22(b). Claims of design defect implicate an entire product line based on the theory that
the risks the product poses to the consumer outweigh any utility she would derive from using it. This contrasts
with construction or manufacturing defects, which usually involve aberrational departures from the product’s
intended design. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 85 (2006).
55
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Waxman, the bill’s sponsor, stated that civil claims for “inadequately
researched” vaccines would be preserved.63 Waxman’s description of such a
claim, that a vaccine’s design did not take adequate account of avoidable safety
risks, suggests a design defect claim.64
The Committee explicitly rejected the opportunity to create a broad
exemption for all design defect claims when it drafted the Vaccine Act. It
considered proposals that would have explicitly preempted all design defect
claims, but the final version did not contain such provisions.65 By rejecting
language that would have barred all design defect claims, Congress showed its
intent to permit courts to decide on a case-by-case basis which side effects
were genuinely “unavoidabl[e].”66 The Committee emphasized that it had not
decided, as a matter of law, which, if any, vaccines were unavoidably unsafe:
“This question is left to the courts to determine in accordance with applicable
law.”67
D. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
The Vaccine Act’s drafters considered the creation of the NVICP among
the Vaccine Act’s most significant components. The NVICP was intended to
“provide[] reimbursement for a wide range of medical and rehabilitative care
for those injured by any vaccine designated by . . . [ACIP] for ‘routine
administration to children.’”68 The NVICP was a reaction to the twin threats of
litigation against vaccine manufacturers and grossly insufficient compensation
to victims that together risked the vaccine program’s viability.69 The NVICP
was conceived as a no-fault administrative regime, meaning that the claimant
did not have to prove the vaccine caused the injury so long as the injury
occurred within specified time limits.70 Within certain time intervals, the
program administrators would presume that the vaccine caused the injury, even
if on a rare occasion that was not the case.71 The Committee intended that the

63

132 CONG. REC. 30,751, 30,760 (1986) (statement of Rep. Waxman); see also Waxman, supra note

52.
64

See Shah, supra note 56, at 231 n.147.
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 100–391(I), at 691 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1,
2313-365.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
COLGROVE, supra note 4, at 215; see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(e)(1)(A), (e)(2) (2012).
69
See Schaefer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Sykes v. GlaxoSmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
70
See Engstrom, supra note 59, at 1638–40, 1637 n.21.
71
See H.R. REP. 99–908, at 15 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6356.
65
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program compensate children who suffered adverse effects from vaccinations
“quickly, easily, and with certainty and generosity.”72
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims oversees the NVICP.73 The Court of
Federal Claims is responsible for appointing and removing the chief special
master and associate special masters, who serve four-year terms.74 Special
masters manage and decide individual cases.75 They review vaccine injury
claims in two phases: causation and compensation.76 Special masters are
ordinarily lawyers; the majority previously represented the U.S. government in
various capacities.77 In effect, they are specialized judges, developing expertise
and knowledge regarding vaccine injury.
Congress intended that the proceedings under the NVICP be less
adversarial and more informal than lawsuits in civil court.78 According to
Fisher, “the stated purpose of the [Vaccine Act] was to err on the side of
compensating potential vaccine victims in order to offer an effective
alternative to vaccine injury lawsuits.”79 The Vaccine Act contemplated a
forum that would “streamline the process for plaintiffs.”80 To this end,
Congress relaxed both procedural and evidentiary rules.81 Special masters do
not wear judicial robes, can ask questions of witnesses directly, and can hold
hearings over the telephone.82 The right to pretrial discovery of information
from the opposing party or third-party vaccine manufacturers is not automatic,
but the special masters may grant it.83
The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) serves as the respondent to a claimant’s petition; lawyers from the U.S.
72
Id. at 3, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6344; see also Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 270 (1995);
Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Transcript of Meeting of Nov.
18, 2008, at 8, http://www.nvic.org/injury-compensation/vaccineinjury.aspx (statement of Barbara Loe Fisher).
73
See § 300aa-12(c).
74
See id.
75
See id. § 300aa-12(d).
76
See generally OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, U.S. COURT OF FED. CLAIMS, GUIDELINES FOR PRACTICE
UNDER THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM (2004).
77
See, e.g., Special Masters – Biographies, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/
special-masters-biographies (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
78
See Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 270 (1995).
79
Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 72; see also
H.R. REP. 99–908, at 12–13 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6353–54.
80
COLGROVE, supra note 4, at 215.
81
See id.
82
See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1), (d)(2)(A) (2012). §300aa-12(d)(2)(A) states the guidelines for the
VICP are to: “provide for a less-adversarial, expeditious, and informal proceeding for the resolution of
petitions.”
83
See id. § 300aa-12(d)(2).
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Department of Justice (DOJ) represent HHS. Respondent HHS may concede,
settle, or oppose claims, arguing insufficient evidence to prove causation.84
Vaccine manufacturers are not parties to the litigation and bear no liability;85
compensation comes out of a consumer-funded trust fund.86 Litigated case
decisions and some settlement agreements are available on the Federal Court
of Claims website.87
The NVICP pays the claimants’ reasonable attorney’s fees, although some
petitioners may file pro se to represent themselves as well.88 The NVICP’s
compensation practices for lawyers often make it difficult for claimants to find
professional representation.89
The special masters’ decisions are due a high level of deference by higher
courts. Reviewing courts may only reverse and remand a special master’s
decisions if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.”90 Petitioners and the DOJ may appeal cases to the
Court of Federal Claims, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and,
ultimately, to the U.S. Supreme Court.91
E. The Vaccine Injury Table
Congress intended that the Vaccine Act’s primary mechanism for ensuring
victim compensation would be the Vaccine Injury Table (Table), a decision aid
to facilitate quick, administrative resolution of claims.92 The Table is meant to
relieve claimants from shouldering the burden of proving causation in a field
that the Court of Appeals described as “bereft of complete and direct proof of
how vaccines affect the human body.”93 The Vaccine Act accomplishes this by
creating statutory presumptions of causation for certain injuries and adverse
events stipulated in the Table.94 Congress included recognized vaccine-induced
84

See id. § 300aa-12(b)(1) (noting that the HHS Secretary is the only defendant).
See id. § 300aa-11(a)(3).
86
See id. § 300aa-15(f)(4)(A).
87
See USCFC Vaccine Reported, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/aggregator/
sources/7 (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).
88
See § 300aa-15(e).
89
Robert Moxley, The “Vaccine Court” Is Hazardous to Your Health, AM. CONSERVATIVE (Mar. 30,
2017), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-vaccine-court-is-hazardous-to-your-health/
(“The injured and their counsel (the latter economically oppressed by the program’s prohibition against private
attorneys fees) encounter a Kafkaesque system.”).
85

90

§ 300aa-12(e)(2)(B), (f).

91

See id. § 300aa-12(e)(1).
See id. § 300aa-11(b).
Althen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
See id.

92
93
94
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injuries in the Table when it passed the Vaccine Act, including anaphylaxis,
paralytic polio, encephalopathy, and death, all within prescribed time periods
after vaccination.95
If a claimant meets the Table’s requirements for a specific injury, she is
entitled to compensation with no need to prove causation. For instance, if an
individual could demonstrate that encephalopathy occurred within fifteen days
after she received the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine, she would
qualify for compensation unless the Secretary of HHS could rebut the claim by
proving that injury or death was caused by “factors unrelated to the
administration of the vaccine.”96
Notably, the Vaccine Act contains a provision allowing the Secretary of
HHS to change the Table. By law, the Secretary can add or delete injuries and
conditions for which compensation would be available and can change the
applicable time periods by which the onset of symptoms must occur.97 Despite
initial protest, negotiators for the industry and doctors assured Fisher and other
parents who assisted in drafting the Vaccine Act that such a provision was
necessary so that the compensation program could become more generous for
newly recognized vaccine injuries in the future.98 They learned later, however,
that the option to change the Table could cut both ways: it could eliminate
avenues to compensation as well as expand them.99
The Vaccine Act also permits so-called “off-Table” or causation-in-fact
claims for injuries not included in the Table. Petitioners whose claims do not
fall within the Table have the burden to prove that a given vaccine’s
administration caused a specific injury by a preponderance of the evidence.100
Thus for off-Table claims, “the ‘heavy lifting must be done by the
petitioner.’”101 Likewise, the DOJ ordinarily assumes an adversarial posture
when defending against off-Table claims.102

95

See § 300aa-14(a).
Id. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B).
97
Id. § 300aa-14(c).
98
See discussion infra pp. 118–19; see also H.R. REP. 99–908, at 20 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6361; Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra
note 72, at 15–16.
99
See Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 72, at
15–16.
100
See § 300aa-13(a)(1).
101
Shemin, supra note 5, at 476 (quoting Hodges v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 9
F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
102
See id.
96
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Extremely few new injuries have been added to the Table since 1986, but
they include anaphylaxis within four hours of hepatitis B vaccination, shoulder
injury related to vaccine administration after any vaccine within forty-eight
hours, and vasovagal syncope within one hour after several vaccines.103
Although nine new vaccines have been added to the schedule of federally
recommended childhood vaccines, only these injuries have been added to the
Table.104
When the NVICP began, about 74% of cases were resolved as on-Table
injuries; today, 98% of cases are resolved off-Table, involving complex
litigation over causation.105 This kind of litigation is precisely what Congress
intended to avoid by creating the NVICP.
F. Limitation on Compensation and Damages
Congressman Henry Waxman conceded that the Vaccine Act contained
some unpopular compromises:
I recognize that the bill I have introduced is probably not the first
choice of most parties to this controversy. Manufacturers would
undoubtedly prefer greater insulation from liability. Parents of
injured children would certainly prefer larger compensation and
fewer restrictions on court activity. The Reagan administration
would, I am sure, prefer legislation that spends no money.106

While the Vaccine Act sets out generous compensation for injury expenses,
rehabilitation, and other associated costs for those who win their petitions,107
there are noteworthy limits. The Vaccine Act provides that claimants can
receive a maximum of $250,000 “[f]or actual and projected pain and

103
Vaccine Injury Table, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/
sites/default/files/vaccinecompensation/injurytable.pdf.
104
Before the Vaccine Act, states generally required vaccines against polio, diphtheria, tetanus,
pertussis, measles, mumps and rubella. See Paul A. Offit, Vaccine History: Developments by Year, CHILD.
HOSP. PHILA. (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.chop.edu/centers-programs/vaccine-education-center/vaccinehistory/developments-by-year. The additional vaccines that have been added to the CDC’s ACIPrecommended schedule since are to protect against hepatitis B, rotavirus, haemophilus influenzae type b,
pneumococcal, influenza, varicella, hepatitis A, meningococcal and human papillomavirus. See Child and
Adolescent Schedule, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/
schedules/hcp/imz/child-adolescent.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
105
Engstrom, supra note 59, at 1702–03.
106
Vaccine Injury Compensation: Hearing on H.R. 1780, H.R. 4777, & H.R. 5184 Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Env’t of the H. Comm. of Energy & Commerce, 99th Cong. 2 (1986) (statement of Rep.
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health & the Env’t of the H. Comm. of Energy & Commerce).
107
See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II), (a)(1)(b)(iii) (2012).
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suffering . . . from the vaccine-related injury.”108 Special masters have the
discretion to completely deny compensation for expert witnesses if they deem
the medical expert testimony to be unreasonable.109 And compensation for
wrongful death claims is capped at $250,000 for all petitioners.110 These caps,
which have remained unchanged since 1986, are worth less than half that
amount today.111
An excise tax levied on all vaccines in the United States funds the no-fault
compensation fund, out of which awards are paid.112 Since the NVICP began
taking claims in 1989, it has handled over 16,500 cases and determined that
over 5,500 of those cases were “compensable.”113 It has paid affected families
approximately $3.7 billion.114
G. Opt-Out Procedure
Part of the Vaccine Act’s compromise is that families must file a claim in
the NVICP within three years of the first manifestation of injury.115 It allows
the families, though, to exit the NVICP and bring a civil action in federal
district or state court after the 240-day waiting period116 or if the claimant
rejects the special master’s decision.117 So while the Vaccine Act
circumscribes plaintiffs’ access to state and federal civil courts, in theory it
upholds the right to go to civil court after first filing in the NVICP.118
Engstrom points out, though, that many dimensions of the Vaccine Act
made it very difficult to take claims out of the NVICP, even before the
Bruesewitz decision.119 The Vaccine Act creates a presumption that all
108

Id. § 300aa-15(a)(4).
See Perreira v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 31 (1992), aff’d, 33
F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding that the petitioner had no definitive medical evidence and, therefore, the
medical expert’s testimony was unreasonable and non-compensable); see also Katherine Davenport, Vaccines
and the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 49 (Apr. 10, 2000) (unpublished third-year paper,
Harvard Law School), https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/9453695.
110
See § 300aa-15(a)(2).
111
See id. Because of inflation, $250,000 in 1986 is equal to only $111,890.83 in 2017. CPI Inflation
Calculator, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Dec. 18,
2017).
112
See Davenport, supra note 109, at 43. An “excise tax of 75 cents per dose is imposed on each vaccine
covered under the NVICP.” Id.
113
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH RES. & HUMAN SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 20.
114
See id.
115
See § 300aa-16(a)(2).
116
See id. § 300aa-21(b)(1).
117
See id. § 300aa-21(a); see also Shah, supra note 56, at 203.
118
See Shah, supra note 56, at 203, 220.
119
Engstrom, supra note 59, at 1664.
109
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warnings that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves are adequate,
thus preventing state courts from independently assessing warnings.120 The
Vaccine Act also codifies the “learned intermediary doctrine,” thus eliminating
any potential claims that the parents or individual did not receive product
warnings directly.121 And in the event that a claimant does go to civil court,
punitive damages are unavailable except in cases of fraud, intentional
wrongdoing, or other illegal activity.122
H. Liability Protection for “Unavoidably Unsafe” Products
Although a claimant may bring a civil action if she meets the Vaccine
Act’s exhaustion requirement, the Vaccine Act limits vaccine manufacturers’
civil liability.123 The Vaccine Act achieved this through its incorporation of
language from the Second Restatement of Torts (Restatement) treatise on
products liability, which most state courts adopted in the mid-1960s.124 The
Restatement describes all vaccines as “unavoidably unsafe” products and
implicitly recommended that manufacturers not be liable for injuries if doctors
administered them properly.125 The Restatement comment k provides, in
relevant part:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs.
An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of
rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging
consequences when it is injected. . . . Such a product, properly
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.126

The authors of the Restatement in commentary reasoned that people
infected with rabies would accept an unavoidably unsafe vaccine over
imminent death.127 Unfortunately, the Restatement did not address the typical
case of a healthy child, not facing imminent death, receiving an unavoidably
unsafe product. Despite the fact that this logic is inapt for childhood

120

See § 300aa-22(b)(2).
The Vaccine Act codifies this understanding at § 300aa-22(c).
122
See § 300aa-23(d)(2).
123
See generally id. § 300aa-22.
124
Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth W. Starr and Erwin Chemerinsky in Support of Petitioners Urging
Reversal at 18–19, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 562 U.S. 223 (2011) (No. 09-152).
125
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST.1965).
126
Id. (emphasis omitted).
127
Id.
121
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immunizations given to healthy children not facing imminent death, this
concept is still a fundamental element of the Vaccine Act.
After the NVICP began accepting claims in 1988, no vaccine manufacturer
could be liable for a vaccine-related injury or death so long as “the injury or
death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine
was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and
warnings.”128
For decades, courts split on whether the Vaccine Act preserved the right to
sue for vaccine design defects. Some design defect lawsuits before and after
the Vaccine Act were successful, such as the case of Toner v. Lederle
Labsoratories, in which the Ninth Circuit found that Lederle Laboratories was
negligent for having failed to improve the design of its vaccine.129 In American
Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari, the Supreme Court of Georgia in 2008
unanimously upheld the right of a plaintiff to sue a vaccine manufacturer for
including thimerosal, a mercury-containing preservative, in its vaccines as a
design defect.130 The decision confirmed that civil courts must decide whether
a vaccine defect was unavoidable on a case-by-case basis.131 The Pennsylvania
Superior Court, the state’s civil appellate court, reached the same conclusion in
its interpretation of the Vaccine Act.132 But from 1986 through 2011, circuit
courts came to differing interpretations on the right to sue for vaccine design
defects.133 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC
that the Vaccine Act preempts all design defect civil claims.134
I. The Problems of the Vaccine Act
Engstrom, studying the NVICP as a prototype for proposed specialized
health courts, found that it paints a “gloomy portrait.”135 She argues that the
thirty-year NVICP experiment should “shake public confidence in this new
alternative mechanism—and inform future analysis.”136 This must be true both

128

§ 300aa-22(b)(1).
Toner v. Lederle Labs., 828 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1987),
130
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. 2008).
131
See id.
132
See Wright v. Aventis Pasteur Inc.,14 A.3d 850, 884 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
133
See, e.g., Abbot v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988); Hurley v. Lederle Labs. Div.
of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988); Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 20 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
1994).
134
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 231–32 (2011).
135
Engstrom, supra note 59, at 1715.
136
Id. at 1717.
129
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for future courts in the United States and for potential exportation of this model
to the developing world.
The NVICP has not lived up to the expectations Congress set out for it—to
be fair, consistent, non-adversarial, and speedy. To show this, Engstrom cites a
document from the department of HHS that reviews medical claims before
they proceed to the NVICP.137 This HHS document acknowledges that NVICP
judgments are inconsistent.138 Further, Petitioners’ counsel told Engstrom that
the single biggest factor relating to whether they win or lose a case is its
special master assignment.139
Engstrom’s research shows that the NVICP on average takes two and a half
times longer to process claims than the traditional tort system—sixty-six
months in the NVICP compared to 25.6 months for tort cases.140 She also
found that NVICP cases on average take longer than consumer class actions,
which take roughly thirty-two months.141 These indicators, coupled with the
reality that only 2% of cases rest on presumptive Table injuries,142 make it
clear that the system is not working.
J. HHS Administrative Changes in the 1990s
In the early 1990s, just a few years after the Vaccine Act took effect, the
HHS Secretary Shalala used her discretionary authority to change the Table,
eliminating some of the most important presumptions for recovery then in use
for injuries from the DPT vaccine.143 For example, Secretary Shalala removed
“residual seizure disorder” from the Table, nullifying the presumptive
compensation category for children who suffered seizures immediately after
the DPT vaccine. As a result, almost all DPT vaccine seizure disorder cases
became off-Table, thus requiring litigation. Those cases met inconsistent
results.144

137
See HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHAT YOU NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM (VICP) 8 (2016) (“HHS reviews the
medical information in the claim and this review is sent to the DOJ lawyer who represents the Secretary of
Health and Human Services . . . .”).
138
See Engstrom, supra note 59, at 1677 (citing DIV. OF VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, NATIONAL
VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN app. H at 25 (2006)).
139
See id.
140
Id. at 1686.
141
Id. at 1686–87.
142
Id. at 1702–03.
143
42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1996).
144
See Andreu v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (allowing
compensation for seizures caused by DPT vaccine). But see Bruesewitz v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health &
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Shalala also changed the Table definition of “encephalopathy,” a
recognized compensable injury,145 leading to a process that has radically
reduced the number of on-Table petitions from 74% before 1995 to about 2%
by 2015.146 As Engstrom discusses, a Government Accountability Office report
“scolded HHS for ‘bas[ing] its decisions to add or remove table injuries on
various factors’ without ‘a clear and transparent methodology to demonstrate
that these factors were consistently applied.’”147 In 1995, the chair of the
Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines, a body Congress created to
oversee the NVICP, referred to the amendments as “a repudiation of the
principles on which the compensation program” was created.148 Even
Congress, in a 2000 report, stated that “HHS’s actions had ‘undermin[ed] the
remedial nature of the program as intended by the Congress.’”149
Plaintiffs challenged the HHS administrative changes and appealed them to
the First Circuit. The First Circuit upheld HHS’s administrative discretion to
make changes to the Table.150 These changes altered the character of the
NVICP fundamentally. According to Fisher, a vaccine safety advocate, these
HHS actions “turned the administrative compensation process into a highly
adversarial, lengthy, expensive, traumatic, and unfair imitation of a court trial
for vaccine victims and their attorneys.”151
Engstrom explains that the statutory malleability of the Table also makes it
subject to manipulation.152 The administrative ability to “dramatically alter a
program’s size, scope, and character” can undermine the perception of a

Human Servs., No. 95-0266V, 2002 WL 31965744 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 20, 2002) (denying compensation for
seizure disorder allegedly caused by DPT vaccine).
145
Press Release, Patricia Campbell, Health Resources & Servs. Admin, Regulation—Vaccine
Compensation (Aug. 21, 1992), https://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20130930182617/http://archive.hhs.gov/
news/press/1992pres/920821.txt.
146
Engstrom, supra note 59, at 1702–03.
147
Id. at 1704 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-8,
VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION: PROGRAM CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY AND EASILY 3
(1999)).
148
Id. (quoting Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Transcript of Meeting of March 1, 1995, at 2).
149
Id. at 1704 n.338 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106–977, at 2 (2000)).
150
See O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the Secretary of HHS had the
power to promulgate a rule removing residual seizure disorder from the vaccine injury table and changing the
definition of encephalopathy). The petitioners also brought an appellate suit in the Court of Federal Claims
after they were denied compensation under the NVICP. O’Connell v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 217
F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
151
Advisory Comm’n on Childhood Vaccines, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 72, at 14.
152
See Engstrom, supra note 59, at 1703.
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tribunal’s legitimacy, diminishing the public’s faith in government.153 She
asserts that specialized courts are “peculiarly susceptible to being thought
partisan.”154
K. Compensating Victims
NVICP proceedings are exceptionally hostile and frequently take many
years. Engstrom cites an example of when it took twelve years, from 1998 until
2010, for the NVICP simply to deny compensation.155 Furthermore, the rigid
three-year statute of limitations likely excludes many legitimate cases of
vaccine injury. The Table was drafted when it was believed that almost all
vaccine injuries occurred within hours or days of vaccination.156 That injury
occurs so quickly is no longer the view of many physicians and scientists.
Some disabilities that may be related to vaccination occur years after the event,
and HHS has acknowledged this in some cases.157 While many lawmakers
have proposed a longer statute of limitations, the current three-year window
continues in force.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims decision in Cloer v. Secretary of Health
& Human Services made the three-year period even more onerous by holding
that the three years from first manifestation of injury could not be tolled when
subsequent science showed that the injury was vaccine-related after the threeyear window.158 So, if an individual learns more than three years after the first
manifestation of multiple sclerosis symptoms that the manifestations might be
vaccine-related, as was the case for Dr. Cloer, she may not obtain
compensation.
The former Chief Special Master Gary Golkiewicz acknowledged the
NVICP’s bias against petitioners in an interview with a reporter.159 He said that

153

Id.
Id. at 1705 (quoting David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative
Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 72 (1975)).
155
Id. at 1687 (citing Kolakowski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-0625V, 2010 WL
5672753 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 23, 2010)).
156
See Vaccine Injury Table, supra note 103, where the longest period for first symptom or
manifestation of onset or of significant aggravation after vaccine administration is less than or equal to twelve
months.
157
See, e.g., Poling v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-1466V, 2011 WL 678559, at *1 (Fed.
Cl. Jan. 28, 2011) (“Hannah’s encephalopathy eventually manifested as a chronic encephalopathy with
features of autism spectrum disorder and a complex partial seizure disorder as a sequel.”).
158
Cloer v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 654 F.3d 1322, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
159
ARTHUR ALLEN, VACCINE: THE CONTROVERSIAL STORY OF MEDICINE’S GREATEST LIFESAVER 293
(2007).
154
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HHS and the DOJ “altered the game so that it’s clearly in their favor . . . . This
group has a vested interest in vaccines being good. It doesn’t take a mental
giant to see the fundamental unfairness in this.”160 The Vaccine Act, and the
NVICP in particular, simply have not fulfilled its mission to compensate
vaccine injury victims like Hannah Bruesewitz, whose vaccine injury case
landed in the Supreme Court in 2011.161
L. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
Hannah Bruesewitz suffered severe brain damage and a permanent seizure
disorder within hours after receiving her third DPT vaccine in 1992.162 She
litigated for more than fifteen years and ultimately received no compensation
from the NVICP.163
Hannah’s pediatrician administered the vaccine to the then-healthy sixmonth-old, according to the federally recommended childhood immunization
schedule.164 Within hours of vaccination, Hannah experienced her first seizure
and experienced a total of 125 seizures over the next sixteen days.165 Hannah
had no previous medical history of seizures.166 Her symptoms became more
severe in the following months; Hannah’s medical records described her as
lethargic, developmentally delayed, and presenting “autistic-like features.”167
At the age of twenty months, Hannah was non-verbal and understood only
simple commands.168 Seven of eight electroencephalograms (EEGs) taken
between April 1992 and July 1995 showed abnormalities, and a computed
tomography (CT) scan taken in July 1995 indicated diffuse neuronal loss.169
Her doctors eventually diagnosed her with residual seizure disorder and
developmental delay.170 Hannah is still diagnosed with both conditions.

160

Id.
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011).
162
Bruesewitz v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 95-0266V, 2002 WL 31965744,
at *1 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 20, 2002).
163
The Bruesewitzes filed a petition on April 3, 1995. See id. The Supreme Court reached its decision on
February 22, 2011. See Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 223.
164
Bruesewitz, 2002 WL 3196744, at *2.
165
See id. at *2–4.
166
See Russ Bruesewitz, Justice Disserved: The Hannah Bruesewitz Odyssey, in VACCINE EPIDEMIC:
HOW CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE GOVERNMENT THREATEN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS,
OUR HEALTH, AND OUR CHILDREN 104–13, 105 (Louise Kuo Habakus & Mary Holland eds., 2d ed. 2012).
167
See Bruesewitz, 2002 WL 31965744, at *4–5.
168
See id. at *6.
169
See id. at *4–7.
170
Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 230.
161
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Hannah, now in her twenties, continues to suffer from residual seizure disorder
and remains severely developmentally impaired.171
Lederle Laboratories, which Wyeth Pharmaceuticals purchased in 1994,
manufactured Tri-Immunol, the DPT vaccine that Hannah received.172 Despite
an awareness of DPT’s dangers and the availability of an alternative version
believed to cause fewer adverse events173—the diphtheria-tetanus-acellular
pertussis (DTaP) vaccine—Wyeth did not take Tri-Immunol off the market
until 1998.174
In addition to raising design defect concerns, Hannah’s case raised
questions about improper manufacturing. Hannah’s vaccine dose came from a
lot that caused a disproportionately large number of adverse events. The
Vaccine Adverse Events Reporting System (VAERS) had already received
reports of one death and thirty adverse events by the time Hannah was
vaccinated.175 VAERS reports eventually linked the lot to sixty-five adverse
reactions, “including thirty-nine emergency room visits, six hospitalizations,
and two deaths.”176
Within the three-year statute of limitations, in April 1995, Hannah’s
parents filed a petition for on-Table vaccine injury in the NVICP for vaccineinduced residual seizure disorder and encephalopathy.177 Although the Vaccine
Act established a fixed deadline for the NVICP to issue decisions “not later
than 240 days . . . after the date the petition was filed,”178 a special master
denied the Bruesewitzes’s claim in December 2002, more than seven years
after they filed their petition in the NVICP.179 The decision cited several
grounds for denial, including the fact that residual seizure disorder was no
longer included on the Table at the time the Bruesewitzes filed their petition.180
In fact, one month prior to the filing of Hannah’s petition, HHS Secretary
Shalala removed DPT-associated residual seizure disorder from the Table.181
171

See id.
See id.
173
See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011).
174
See id.
175
See Brief for Petitioner at 20, Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. 223 (No. 09-152).
176
Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 237.
177
Bruesewitz v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No-95-0266V, 2002 WL 31965744,
at *1 (Dec. 20, 2002).
178
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012).
179
See Bruesewitz, 2002 WL 31965744, at *17.
180
42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (1996); see also Bruesewitz, 2002 WL 31965744, at *17.
181
See Bruesewitz, 2002 WL 31965744, at *1 n.1.
172
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As a result, Hannah was precluded from taking advantage of the presumption
of causation she would have received had she filed the claim one month
earlier.182 Absent the presumption, the Bruesewitzes were required to establish
causation by a preponderance of the evidence, a burden that the special master
concluded they did not meet.183
The Bruesewitzes rejected the special master’s judgment and commenced
an action in Pennsylvania state court in October 2005, more than ten years
after they had filed their initial petition in the NVICP. Their complaint alleged
theories of strict products liability and negligent vaccine design, claims they
could not advance in the NVICP.184
Wyeth removed the suit to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which
granted Wyeth summary judgment on both causes of action, holding that
§ 300aa-22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act preempted state common law causes of
action for defective design.185 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision, concluding that the Vaccine Act’s language barred design defect
claims.186
M. The Supreme Court’s Decision
The Bruesewitzes petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in
August 2009, as did American Home Products Corporation, then-owned by
Wyeth, the respondent in Ferrari, another case raising the issue of vaccine
design defect under the Vaccine Act.187 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Bruesewitz, and issued its decision in February 2011.188
Justice Scalia authored the Court’s decision in which Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito joined. Justice Sotomayor
wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justice Kagan
recused herself as she had been Solicitor General when the DOJ had prepared

182
See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Revision of the Vaccine Injury Table, 60 Fed.
Reg. 7678, 7691 (Feb. 8, 1995); see also Andreu v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1374,
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding sufficient medical evidence to establish causation in fact for claim of seizure
disorder caused by DPT vaccine).
183
See Bruesewitz, 2002 WL 31965744, at *13–17.
184
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 231 (2011).
185
Id. at 231.
186
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011).
187
Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. 2008), vacated, 562 U.S. 1254 (2011).
188
See Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 223.
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its briefs in the case.189 The Court held that the Vaccine Act’s text and
structure bar all state law claims of design defect against vaccine
manufacturers.190
Justice Scalia began by setting forth the relevant statutory text, which the
Supreme Court of Georgia191 and the Third Circuit192 had interpreted
differently:
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for damages
arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the
administration of a vaccine after October 1, 1988, if the injury or
death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though
the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper
directions and warnings.193

Although he did not describe this as an express preemption clause, one can
infer that Justice Scalia believed that § 22(b)(1) provided sufficient evidence of
a clear and manifest preemptive purpose to qualify it as express preemption.194
Several of the Justices pointed out that this statutory provision is extremely
ambiguous and poorly drafted.195 The Court’s decision hinged on the “even
though” clause’s ability to clarify the meaning of the word “unavoidable” on
its own.196 According to the Court, properly preparing a vaccine and
accompanying it with proper warnings render all resulting side effects
unavoidable for purposes of the Vaccine Act, exempting manufacturers from
design defect liability.197 Justice Scalia found this interpretation necessary so
that the word “unavoidable” has meaning, as “[a] side effect of a vaccine could
always have been avoidable by use of a differently designed vaccine not

189
See id. at 243; Solicitor General: Elena Kagan, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.
justice.gov/osg/bio/elena-kagan.
190
See Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 240, 243.
191
See Am. Home Prods. Corp., 668 S.E.2d at 237–38.
192
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC,
562 U.S. 223 (2011).
193
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
194
Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 238 (“[W]e do not suggest that the absence of guidance alone suggests preemption. But the lack of guidance for design defects combined with the extensive guidance for the two
grounds of liability specifically mentioned in the [Vaccine] Act strongly suggests that design defects were not
mentioned because they are not a basis for liability.”)
195
Transcript of Oral Argument at 16, Bruesewitz, 526 U.S. 223 (No. 09-152) (Justice Breyer: “I think
[the language is] ambiguous”).
196
See Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 231–32.
197
See id.
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containing the harmful element.”198 According to Justice Scalia, a vaccine’s
design is “a given” and “not subject to question in the tort action.”199
Justice Scalia concluded that a textual interpretation did not depend on the
“if” clause.200 Justice Scalia subsequently focused only on the plain dictionary
definition of the word “unavoidable.”201 This is problematic because
“unavoidable” is a term of art in strict products liability and directly relates to
the interpretation of § 22(b)(1).
Comment k to the Restatement § 402A exempts from strict products
liability:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made
safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. . . . Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective,
nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many . . . drugs,
vaccines, and the like . . . .202

In contrast to Justice Scalia’s view, most state approaches to comment k do
“not entail a categorical pronouncement that a particular product is
unavoidably unsafe in all circumstances.”203 Rather, the majority view is that a
court must make case-by-case determinations as to whether a particular side
effect was unavoidable.204
According to the dissent, comment k transformed the phrase “unavoidably
unsafe” into a term of art.205 Despite extensive legislative history to the
contrary,206 Justice Scalia found “no reason to believe” that Congress invoked
198

Id. at 232.
Id.
200
Id. at 233.
201
Id. at 234–35.
202
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (AM. LAW INST.1965) (emphasis omitted).
203
Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth W. Starr and Erwin Chemerinsky in Support of Petitioners Urging
Reversal, supra note 124, at 19.
204
Id. (“Under the majority approach to comment k, a court must make a case-by-case determination of
whether a certain side effect is unavoidable. Comment k does not entail a categorical pronouncement that a
particular product is unavoidably unsafe in all circumstances.”).
205
Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 257, (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
206
See H.R. REP. NO. 99–908, at 25 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6366 (“This
provision sets forth the principle contained in Comment k of Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts
(Second) . . . .”); see also id. at 26, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6367 (“The Committee has set forth Comment K in
this bill because it intends that the principle in Comment K regarding ‘unavoidably unsafe’ products, i.e., those
products which in the present state of human skill and knowledge cannot be made safe, apply to the vaccines
covered in the bill and that such products not be the subject of liability in the tort system.”).
199
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comment k in drafting § 22(b)(1) because it used the word “unavoidable”
instead of the phrase “unavoidably unsafe.”207 Refusing to give the word any
special significance, the Court concluded that § 22(b)(1) categorically
preempts design defect claims against vaccine manufacturers.208
Perhaps in recognition of the problematic nature of its textual argument,
the Court grounded its reading of § 22(b)(1) in the structure of the Vaccine Act
as a whole. Justice Scalia argued that because neither the Vaccine Act nor
FDA regulations ever expressly mentioned design defects, “Congress must
have intended to remove issues concerning the design of FDA-licensed
vaccines from the tort system.”209 This fails to acknowledge, however, that the
FDA was silent on vaccine design defects before the Vaccine Act’s passage,
during which time vaccine manufacturers were liable for defective design in
state courts.210 As Justice Sotomayor wrote in dissent:
That the Vaccine Act did not itself set forth a comprehensive
regulatory scheme with respect to design defects is thus best
understood to mean not that Congress suddenly decided to change
course sub silentio and pre-empt a longstanding, traditional category
of state tort law, but rather, that Congress intended to leave the status
quo alone (except, of course, with respect to those aspects of state
tort law that the [Vaccine] Act expressly altered.211

And while Justice Scalia is correct that “whenever the FDA concludes that a
vaccine is unsafe, it may revoke the license,”212 the author is unaware that it
has ever done so.213
Justice Scalia argued that tort claims for design defects cannot serve any
additional purpose because the Vaccine Act, through the NVICP, provides
means both to encourage improved designs and to compensate injuries.214 But
as Justice Sotomayor pointed out, the NVICP’s no-fault scheme cannot
possibly spur vaccine manufacturers to innovate because it imposes no legal
duty on them to ensure that they provide the safest products possible in light of

207

Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 234 (majority opinion).
See id. at 234.
209
Id. at 268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
210
Id.
211
Id. at 269.
212
Id. at 239 (majority opinion).
213
See Vaccine Recalls, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Aug. 28, 2015),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/concerns/recalls.html (“Vaccine recalls or withdrawals are almost always
initiated voluntarily by the vaccine manufacturer.”).
214
See Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 238.
208
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scientific and technological advances.215 States have traditionally imposed such
a duty by allowing civil damages for design defects.216
Justice Scalia’s statement that the Court would be skeptical “unless the
congressional substitute operated like the tort system,”217 seems to disregard
how the NVICP actually functions. Because of the compensation program’s
no-fault nature, vaccine manufacturers themselves have no financial
responsibility for injuries from defectively designed vaccines. And because
HHS is the respondent in all NVICP cases, vaccine manufacturers do not even
face the burden of defending themselves.
Moreover, it is not possible to bring traditional product liability causes of
action in the NVICP, only claims for personal injury. Most troubling, however,
is the Court’s view that the NVICP is an adequate substitute for the tort
system.218 Justice Scalia’s idealized view of the NVICP implies that almost all
cases are on-Table, as Congress intended. But the reality is that 98% of cases
are fiercely litigated in a forum designed as an administrative tribunal.
Finally, the Court asserted that vaccine manufacturers contribute a portion
of their profits toward the compensation program’s trust fund, a quid pro quo
for receiving immunity from liability for defective designs.219 This is
inaccurate, however. In fact, consumers entirely fund the trust fund, paying a
$0.75 excise tax on each vaccine to the federal government.220 Justice Scalia’s
suggestion that vaccine market demand is elastic221 is also misleading. Given
state childhood vaccination mandates as well as patents and other high barriers
to entry that keep market competition to a minimum, it is unlikely that vaccine
excise taxes influence manufacturers’ profits. The world’s leading vaccine
manufacturers received over $16.8 billion from childhood vaccine sales alone

215

See id. at 269–70 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See id. at 270.
217
Id. at 240.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 239–40.
220
“The majority’s suggestion that ‘vaccine manufacturers fund from their sales’ the compensation
program is misleading. Although the manufacturers nominally pay the tax, the amount of the tax is specifically
included in the vaccine price charged to purchasers. Accordingly, the only way the vaccine manufacturers can
be said to actually ‘fund’ the compensation program is if the cost of the excise tax has an impact on the
number of vaccines sold by the vaccine manufacturer. The majority points to no evidence that the excise tax—
which ordinarily amounts to 75 cents per dose—has any impact whatsoever on the demand for vaccines.” Id. at
272 n.22 (citations omitted).
221
Id. at 239 n.64 (majority opinion) (“The dissent’s unsupported speculation that demand in the vaccine
market is inelastic sheds no light on whether Congress regarded the tax as a quid pro quo, most Members of
Congress being neither professional economists nor law-and-economics scholars.” (citations omitted)).
216
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in 2015.222 Thus, vaccine manufacturers have gained immensely from almostblanket tort liability protection with no quid pro quo.
N. The Dissent
In a long and scathing dissent, Justice Sotomayor dissected the majority
decision and argued in effect that it was decided according to policy preference
rather than law. In holding that the Vaccine Act preempts all design defect
claims for vaccine injuries, she wrote:
[T]he Court imposes its own bare policy preference over the
considered judgment of Congress. In doing so, the Court excises 13
words from the statutory text, misconstrues the [Vaccine] Act’s
legislative history, and disturbs the careful balance Congress struck
between compensating vaccine-injured children and stabilizing the
childhood vaccine market. Its decision leaves a regulatory vacuum in
which no one ensures that vaccine manufacturers adequately take
account of scientific and technological advancements when designing
or distributing their products.223

Justice Sotomayor noted that the majority’s decision, based largely on
Wyeth’s own arguments, seemed intent on averting an imagined “crushing
wave” of over 5,000 former NVICP petitions reaching civil courts to allege a
causal link between vaccines and autism spectrum disorders.224 Wyeth had
argued that such tort litigation about vaccine design defect in civil courts
“would bankrupt vaccine manufacturers and deplete vaccine supply.”225 Justice
Sotomayor wrote that “[t]his concern underlies many of the policy arguments
in respondent’s brief and appears to underlie the majority and concurring
opinions in this case.”226 She noted, however, that this parade of horribles
seemed “wholly speculative.” 227
Justice Sotomayor wrote that the NVICP had rejected vaccine-autism
claims and that the NVICP “rulings do highlight the substantial hurdles to
recovery” that plaintiffs face.228 She also pointed out that trial courts have
222
See Bruce Carlson, Five Things to Know About the Vaccine Industry in 2016, KALORAMA INFO. (Dec.
16, 2016), https://www.kaloramainformation.com/Content/Blog/2016/12/16/Five-Things-to-Know-About-theVaccine-Industry-in-2016 (stating that 57.6% of the global revenue in 2014 of $29.3 billion was due to
pediatric vaccines).
223
Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. at 250 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
224
Id. at 274 n.25.
225
Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 28, Bruesewitz, 562 U.S. 223 (No. 09-152)).
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
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“considerable experience in efficiently handling and disposing of meritless
products liability claims, and decades of tort litigation (including for design
defect) in the prescription-drug context have not led to shortages in
prescription drugs.”229 She discounted such “doomsday predictions” as
“remote at best.”230 But she argued that regardless of the merits of the policy
arguments, the Court’s job is to ensure Congress’s intent.
She concluded in a critically important footnote that the text, structure, and
legislative history of the Vaccine Act “compel the conclusion that Congress
intended to leave the courthouse doors open for children who have suffered
severe injuries from defectively designed vaccines. The majority’s policydriven decision to the contrary usurps Congress’ role and deprives such
vaccine-injured children of a key remedy that Congress intended them to
have.”231
O. The Impact of the Vaccine Act and the Bruesewitz Decision
The Bruesewitz decision removed incentives for pharmaceutical
corporations to conduct the extensive research and development necessary to
ensure that FDA-approved vaccines remain as safe and effective as possible
after licensure. FDA approval alone has not been a sufficient guarantee of drug
safety, owing in part to the FDA’s limited authority to compel further safety
research after final approval.232 Rather, vigorous litigation over drug defects
has spurred manufacturers voluntarily to remove numerous drugs from the
market based on unreleased data on adverse effects, unethical practices, and
flaws in the FDA’s regulatory procedures.233
With no private party able to hold vaccine manufacturers responsible for
post-marketing safety defects, vaccine manufacturers in the United States
enjoy the benefits of a captive market for mandated products with few
economic incentives to make them as safe and effective as possible. While
vaccine-injured victims have the misfortune to serve as “drug safety
researchers of last resort,”234 they are barred in the United States from bringing
lawsuits against manufacturers that might both compensate victims and
stimulate manufacturers to improve vaccine safety.
229

Id.
Id.
231
Id.
232
See, e.g., Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, Commentary, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug
Risks, 297 JAMA 308, 308 (2007).
233
See id.
234
Id. at 311.
230
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P. Empirical Research on Vaccine Injury Before and After the Vaccine Act
An important empirical study recently published confirms that the inability
to sue vaccine manufacturers in U.S. civil courts since 1986 is associated with
a decrease in vaccine safety in FDA-approved vaccines after 1986.235 In this
peer-reviewed analysis, Professor DeLong looked at what happened to vaccine
safety after “delitigation” or removal of litigation risk through the Vaccine Act.
Using national and state-level data, she found that vaccines the FDA licensed
after the Vaccine Act are associated with more adverse events than those it
licensed earlier when consumers could sue.236
The study examines the question whether a regulator, the FDA in this case,
can enforce an optimal level of care, or whether litigation forces firms to
correct unforeseen problems once products are on the market.237 If a regulator
cannot enforce an optimal level of safety without added litigation risk, then
“delitigation [is] associated with deteriorating product safety.”238
DeLong observes that after the Vaccine Act passed in 1986, the amount of
investment in biologic products, including vaccines, tripled from $85.6 million
in 1986 to $273.7 million in 1989.239 Also the number of investigational new
drug applications more than doubled from the 1980s to the 1990s, suggesting
that manufacturers had incentives to produce new and potentially riskier
products.240
DeLong used the VAERS, which only existed after the Vaccine Act took
effect, as her source of data for adverse event reports. While there is no better
data source available, she acknowledges its limitations: VAERS is a passive
reporting system. Medical personnel are not required to report adverse vaccine
events; and while individuals can report events, they too are not required to do
so.241 Furthermore, reported events are not verified, so some events may not
actually be due to vaccines.242 Also, vaccine adverse events are likely
drastically underreported.243

235
Gayle DeLong, Is “Delitigation” Associated with a Change in Product Safety? The Case of
Vaccines, REV. IND. ORG. (June 14, 2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11151-017-9579-7.
236
Id.
237
Id. at pt. 1.
238
Id.
239
Id. at pt. 4.
240
Id.
241
Id. at pt. 5.3.
242
Id.
243
Id.
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DeLong cites to a study from 2007 that tracked vaccine recipients and
found that 20.5 adverse events occur per 1,000 vaccine doses.244 Using that
data suggests likely one in every 170 adverse events is reported.245 DeLong
assumes that the adverse event rate for vaccines approved before 1986 is the
same before and after the introduction of VAERs because the FDA does not
permit manufacturers to alter FDA-approved drugs.246
DeLong found that vaccines licensed after 1986 are associated with
approximately 5.2 more reported adverse events per 100,000 vaccine doses
than the vaccines that were licensed before the passage of Vaccine Act.247 The
weighted averages suggest that pre-legislation vaccines are associated with
14.0 adverse events per 100,000 while post-legislation vaccines are associated
with 19.2 adverse events per 100,000.248 This difference is statistically
significant at the 1% level.249
DeLong showed that the proportion of people that reported a serious
complication from a vaccine after 1986 is more than double the proportion of
people who experienced a serious complication from a disease before a vaccine
for it was available.250 The difference is statistically significant and is likely
greater because of underreporting.251
DeLong’s analysis suggests that the Vaccine Act “gave firms greater
incentives to capture the regulator: If consumers cannot sue firms for product
liability, the only barrier to sales is regulatory approval.”252
She suggests that the Vaccine Act may be creating “moral hazard” because
vaccine manufacturers do not have to answer to people damaged by their
products.253 The manufacturers do not even contribute to the compensation
fund; excise taxes from consumers fund it. DeLong has shown empirically that
“[d]elitigation appears to have removed an important safety monitor in the

244
Id. (“Hinrichsen et al. (2007) tracked vaccine recipients and found 20.5 adverse events per 1,000
doses administered. . . . [While] the VAERS database reflected 0.12 AEs per 1,000 vaccine doses, which
suggests that approximately one in every 170 (=20.5/0.12) AEs is reported.”).
245
Id.
246
Id. at pt. 5 (“Since the FDA does not permit manufacturers to alter an FDA-approved drug, the AE
ratio of a licensed vaccine should not change over time.”).
247
Id. at pt. 5.1 tbl.2.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id. at pt. 6.1.
251
Id.
252
Id. at pt. 8.
253
Id.
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vaccine industry” and suggests the need for further study.254 She suggests that
Dr. Salk, who opposed the creation of the NVICP in congressional hearings
before Congress passed the Vaccine Act, “appears to be prescient in his
concerns that indemnification would reduce incentives to improve an existing
vaccine and to change vaccine policy.”255
Q. Liability Protection in Emergencies: The PREP Act
The NVICP does not apply to all vaccines. It applies only to those vaccines
that that are listed on the Vaccine Injury Table.256 It does not apply to many
vaccines, such as the shingles vaccine for adults. Individuals harmed by those
vaccines may sue in civil court. The NVICP also does not apply to vaccines
put to use in declared public health emergencies.257
In 2005, Congress passed a tort shield law, the PREP Act, to protect
manufacturers of drugs and other “covered countermeasure[s],” including
vaccines, from the risk of damages in the event of a declared public health
emergency.258 This statute goes considerably further than the Vaccine Act to
create an exclusive limited administrative remedy. The PREP Act disallows
those injured to apply to the NVICP; they must apply to an administrative
program that HHS administers itself.259 The PREP Act covers vaccines,
antidotes, medications, medical devices, and other products used to respond to
pandemics and biological and chemical threats.260
If the HHS Secretary declares a public health emergency, then liability
protection covers not only manufacturers, but all medical administrators of the
covered countermeasures to prevent, treat or mitigate an epidemic.261 The
Secretary’s declaration is not reviewable by any court.262
The PREP Act sets up an administrative Countermeasures Injury
Compensation Program (CICP) in HHS for people seriously injured from the

254

Id. at pt. 9.
Id.
256
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(b)(1)(A) (2012).
257
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2012).
258
Id.
259
See Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Oct.
2017), https://www.hrsa.gov/sites/default/files/hrsa/cicp/cicpfactsheet.pdf.
260
See id.
261
§ 247d-6d(a)(2)(B).
262
Id. § 247d-6d(b)(7) (“No court of the United States, or of any State, shall have subject matter
jurisdiction to review, whether by mandamus or otherwise, any action by the Secretary under this
subsection.”).
255
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use of products under a PREP Act declaration.263 The CICP has a one-year
statute of limitations.264 While a claimant may hire a lawyer, unlike in the
NVICP, the CICP does not pay any attorney fees.265 The CICP offers no
hearings or appeals from the CICP decisions; however, a claimant may request
reconsideration of her claim within sixty days if CICP rejected it on the first
review.266 There are no published records of CICP’s compensation decisions,
so it is impossible to analyze them. CICP’s website lists medical expenses, lost
employment income, and survivor death benefits as possible compensation, but
it is unclear whether or to what extent CICP has paid them, as there are no
published decisions.
As of September 2015, HHS adopted a final rule regarding compensation
through the CICP.267 The rule includes a Covered Countermeasures Injury
Table (Countermeasures Table), which contains presumptive injuries from
pandemic flu vaccines and, specifically, the pandemic flu vaccine for the 2009
H1N1 virus, as well as antiviral drugs to treat pandemic flu.268 The
Countermeasures Table creates presumptions of causation in the event of
anaphylaxis within zero to four hours after administration of a pandemic flu
vaccine or the onset of Guillain-Barré Syndrome from three to forty-two days
after vaccine administration.269
HHS has created these presumptions based on “compelling, reliable, valid,
medical and scientific evidence.”270 The Countermeasures Table creates a
rebuttable presumption of injury causation for people who meet its criteria, but
HHS still has the right to contest eligibility in individual cases.271 In addition,
if an individual alleges injuries that do not fall within the Countermeasures
Table, she may still pursue her claim, but she must demonstrate that “the
263

Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program, 42 C.F.R. §110.1 (2016).
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND PREVENTION OF VACCINE PREVENTABLE DISEASES app. D-9 (Jennifer Hamborsky et al.
eds., 13th ed. 2015); see also Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN. (Oct. 2017),
https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/faq/index.html (“[Y]ou have ONE (1) YEAR from the date that the covered
countermeasure was received to file for CICP benefits . . . .”).
265
Frequently Asked Questions, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/cicp/faq/
requesters.html (last reviewed Oct. 2017).
266
Id.
267
42 C.F.R. § 110.30–33.
268
42 C.F.R. § 110.100.
269
Id.
270
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note
264, at app. D-9.
271
Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program: Pandemic Influenza Countermeasures Injury Table,
80 Fed. Reg. 47,411, 47,412 (Aug. 7, 2015) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 110.30) (“[T]his Table creates a rebuttable
presumption of causation for eligible individuals . . . .”).
264
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covered countermeasure directly caused the injury” by “compelling, reliable,
valid, medical and scientific evidence.”272
The only exception to the PREP Act’s blanket liability protection for
industry is when a victim can show evidence of a manufacturer’s “willful
misconduct,” which is a defined term in the statute.273 To be liable, the
defendant must have committed an act or omission that it undertook: “(i)
intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without legal or
factual justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is
so great as to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the
benefit.”274
An injured person may only sue a defendant for willful misconduct in the
federal district court in Washington, D.C.,275 and she bears the burden to prove
willful misconduct “by clear and convincing evidence,” not the usual
preponderance of the evidence standard used in the NVICP or civil court.276
In addition to these almost insurmountable hurdles to justiciability, the
PREP Act further requires that a three-judge panel hear any case of willful
misconduct277 and that civil discovery be limited only “to matters directly
related to [the] material issue[]” in dispute.278 Defendants also cannot be liable
for willful misconduct if the person in question “acted consistent with
applicable directions, guidelines, or recommendations” of the HHS
Secretary.279 Furthermore, unless the HHS Secretary or the Attorney General
has initiated an enforcement action regarding the alleged willful misconduct,
the act or omission cannot constitute willful misconduct under the PREP
Act.280 In other words, the realistic opportunity to sue for willful conduct is
almost nil.
The PREP Act became law over significant consumer and congressional
opposition. Senator Kennedy and twenty colleagues in Congress wrote a letter
to the Speaker of the House and majority leader to repeal the PREP Act.281 In
272
273
274
275
276

Id.
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247(d)-6d(c)(1)(A), (d)(1) (2012).
Id. § 247(d)-6d(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 247d-6d(e)(1).
Id. § 247d-6d(c)(3); see discussion of NVICP preponderance of the evidence standard, supra note

100.
277
278
279
280
281

§ 247d-6d(e)(5).
Id. § 247d-6d(e)(6)(B).
Id. § 247d-6d(c)(4).
Id. § 247d-6d(c)(5).
Sen. Kennedy, Colleagues Call on Majority Leader Frist, Speaker Hastert to Repeal ‘Dead of Night’
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their letter, they characterized the PREP Act as “a travesty of the legislative
process,” and stated that it could “be used to allow manufacturers of virtually
any drug or vaccine to escape responsibility for gross negligence or even
criminal acts.”282 They accused the law’s sponsors of creating “an empty shell
of a compensation program for injured patients with none of the funding
needed to make compensation a reality.”283
The PREP Act’s constitutionality is questionable, raising issues of
preemption, judicial review, and due process.284 Perhaps more importantly,
though, some have suggested that the PREP Act incentivizes manufacturers of
emergency medical products to willfully disregard or consciously avoid
problematic risk information so that they cannot fall within the Act’s
“knowing” requirements. In an article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association about the role of litigation in defining drug risks, the authors cite a
memorandum from a drug company executive, which states: “If the FDA asks
for bad news, we have to give, but if we don’t have it, we can’t give it to
them.”285 It appears that the PREP Act may incentivize precisely this kind of
thinking.
The HHS Secretary has declared nine public health emergencies under the
PREP Act, including declarations for H1N1 pandemic flu vaccines, Ebola
virus vaccines, and Zika virus vaccines.286 Even a superficial comparison of
the PREP Act with the Vaccine Act shows that consumers played little if any
role in drafting the PREP Act.287 With effective access only to an
administrative tribunal, with a one-year statute of limitations, and with no
opportunity for appeal or review in any court, consumers have exceptionally
limited recourse under the PREP Act.

Vaccine Liability Provision, Enact Real Protections, U.S. FED. NEWS, Feb. 15, 2006, 2006 WLNR 2705752
[hereinafter Kennedy Letter].
282
Id.
283
Id.
284
See, e.g., Samuel C. Bauer, Note, Ebola and the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act:
Defining the Outer Boundaries of Unreviewable Administrative Action, 8 NE. U. L.J. 223 (2016); Brian Kurt
Copper, Note, “High and Dry?” The Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and Liability
Protection for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 40 J. HEALTH L. 65 (2007); Angela Marino, Note, The Cost of
a Countermeasure: The Expansive Liability Protection of the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act of 2005, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199 (2009).
285
Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 232, at 309 (quoting Alex Berenson, Trial Lawyers Are Now
Focusing on Lawsuits Against Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at A1).
286
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, PUB.
HEALTH EMERGENCY (May 10, 2017), https://www.phe.gov/preparedness/legal/prepact/pages/default.aspx.
287
Kennedy Letter, supra note 281 (noting that the PREP Act was a “stealth provision,” not “debated in
the open . . . [and] sneaked into a larger bill behind closed doors as a favor to special interests”).
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Most consumers in the United States pay little attention to the fine print
when they get vaccines. Yet whether a person receives a seasonal flu vaccine
or an emergency pandemic one, such as the H1N1 flu shot, could make a world
of difference in what recourse might be available in the event of injury.
***
Neither the Vaccine Act nor the PREP Act provide encouraging models to
balance public health with individual rights. Both models seem skewed to
favor industry, which appears to have exerted significant influence during the
drafting and implementation phases of both statutes.288 While neither statute
provides a good model, the Vaccine Act is the better of the two, as it provides
at least for some level of judicial review.289
Because both U.S. models have significant shortcomings, however, it is
important to look at other potential models.
II. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DIFFERENT APPROACH
On June 21, 2017, the ECJ for the European Union ruled on a case
regarding vaccine injury and potential vaccine manufacturer liability.290 Courts
and tribunals in the European Union’s twenty-eight countries refer questions of
interpretation of E.U. law to the ECJ.291 The ECJ did not decide the underlying
case that France’s highest court referred to it, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD
SNC,292 but the ECJ did offer guidance on its interpretation of E.U. Directive
85/374, regarding liability for defective products, which applies throughout the
European Union.293 The ECJ’s decision applies in all E.U. cases in which

288
For more on industry influence in the drafting of the Vaccine Act, see infra notes 41–44. For more on
industry influence on the PREP Act, see Kennedy letter, supra note 281 (“Republicans gave drug companies
and those who administer a countermeasure effectively complete immunity from suit . . . .”).
289
For a discussion of judicial review of decisions in the NVICP, see note 57. For more on the review of
CICP decisions under the PREP Act, see notes 262, 284.
290
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=first&part=1
&cid=848112.
291
See Countries, EUROPA (Dec. 20, 2017), https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_
en#28members; Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), EUROPA (Dec. 20, 2017), https://europa.eu/
european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en.
292
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/

document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=first&
part=1&cid=848112.
293

See Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 28, 29 (EC).
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similar issues about defective products are involved, and not just cases
regarding vaccines.294
A. N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC
Mr. W., a French man who received three hepatitis B vaccines
manufactured by Sanofi Pasteur between December 1998 and July 1999,
brought the original case.295 Starting in August 1999, Mr. W. began to have
health problems which led to the diagnosis of multiple sclerosis in November
2000.296 By January 2001, Mr. W was no longer able to work because of his
disease, and his health declined progressively until October 2011, when he
died.297
In 2006, Mr. W, his wife, and two daughters brought a claim against Sanofi
Pasteur for damages under strict liability provisions of the French Civil Code
that require a producer to be liable for damage from a product defect.298 French
law requires the plaintiff “to prove the damage, the defect and the causal
relationship between defect and damage.”299 Mr. W. and his family argued that
the close timing between the vaccinations and the onset of his disease
symptoms, as well as the lack of any personal or family history of the disease
gave rise to “serious, specific and consistent presumptions” about the existence
of a defect in the vaccine, and a causal link between the vaccine and the
development of disease.300
In French, the word présomption is a method of legal reasoning where one
fact that is not proven can be inferred from another fact that has been

294
See Presentation, CURIA, https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/en/ (last visited Dec. 20,
2017) (“The Court of Justice’s reply is not merely an opinion, but takes the form of a judgment or reasoned
order. The national court to which it is addressed is, in deciding the dispute before it, bound by the
interpretation given. The Court’s judgment likewise binds other national courts before which the same problem
is raised.”).
295
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 9 (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/

juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=f
irst&part=1&cid=848112.
296

Id.
Id. at para. 10.
298
Id. at para. 11; Case C-621/15, W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 9 (Mar. 7, 2017), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188628&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=
&occ=first&part=1.
299
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, paras. 7, 8 (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=first&p
art=1&cid=848112 (citing art. 1386-9 of the French Civil Code).
300
Id. at para. 11.
297
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proven.301 The presumption can be factual or legal and can be rebuttable,
irrebuttable, or absolute.302 So based on the timing of Mr. W.’s vaccines, the
disease onset, and the lack of family history, Mr. W. asked the court to infer
from these facts that the vaccine was the presumptive cause.303
From 2006 through 2015, French courts ruled first in favor of Mr. W., and
then against him on whether he had established a causal link between the
vaccine and his disease. The Nanterre Regional Court, the court of first
instance, decided in favor of Mr. W., upholding his claim.304
The Versailles Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that a
presumption of injury from the vaccine was insufficient to prove that the
vaccine was defective.305 The Court of Cassation overturned the Versailles
court’s decision, however, holding that the Versailles Court of Appeal had not
provided an adequate legal rationale for its decision.306
The case then went to the Paris Court of Appeal (to avoid bias),307 which
again overturned the Nanterre court’s decision in favor of Mr. W., holding that
there was no scientific consensus to support a causal relationship between the
hepatitis B vaccine and multiple sclerosis.308 The Paris Court of Appeal wrote
that national and international health authorities rejected an association
between demyelinating diseases, like multiple sclerosis, with the hepatitis B
vaccine.309 It also noted that the cause of multiple sclerosis is unknown and

301
Case C-621/15, W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 29 (Mar. 7, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188628&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first
&part=1.
302
Id.
303
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 11 (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=first&p
art=1&cid=848112.
304
Id. at para. 14.
305
Case C-621/15, W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 10 (Mar. 7, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188628&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first
&part=1.
306
Id.
307
See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, European Court Vaccine Decision – A Legal Analysis, SKEPTICAL
RAPTOR (June 25, 2017), https://www.skepticalraptor.com/skepticalraptorblog.php/european-court-vaccinedecision-analysis/ (“The case was sent back down to a different court of appeal (as is usual, to avoid bias in the
original court of appeal), the Court of Appeal of Paris.”).
308
Case C-621/15, W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 11 (Mar. 7, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188628&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first
&part=1.
309
Id. at para. 12.
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that epidemiological studies show that 92% to 95% of people with the disease
have no family history of it.310
Mr. W. then again appealed the case to the Court of Cassation, which
stayed the proceeding, pending a preliminary ruling of the ECJ on how to
interpret Article 4 of EU Directive 85/374 (the Directive) concerning liability
for defective products.311 In addition to the parties, the Czech, German, and
French governments and the European Commission submitted written briefs
and, except for the German government, participated in oral argument at the
hearing at the ECJ in 2016.312
The ECJ’s ruling interpreted the apparently simple text of Article 4 as
“[t]he injured person shall be required to prove the damage, the defect and the
causal relationship between defect and damage.”313 The French Court of
Cassation’s first question to the ECJ was: Does Article 4 permit a national
court to consider “serious, specific and consistent presumptions capable of
proving the defect in the vaccine and the existence of a causal relationship
between it and the disease,” even though medical research neither accepts nor
rejects a causal association?314 The ECJ answered that a national court may
consider “serious, specific and consistent evidence” regarding a vaccine defect,
even if medical research has not yet established or ruled out a connection.315 In
Solomonic language, though, the ECJ cautions that national courts must ensure
that the plaintiff continues to bear the burden of proof of a causal link when the
science is equivocal.316
The Court of Cassation’s second question was contingent on the first:
Assuming a court may hear “serious, specific and consistent presumptions”
regarding vaccine defect when the science is not clear, is the court precluded

310
311
312
313

Id.
Id. at para. 13.
Id. at para. 14.
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 5 (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/

juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=f
irst&part=1&cid=848112 (quoting Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 28, 31 (EC)).
314
Id. at para. 17–18; Case C-621/15, W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 13 (Mar. 7, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188628&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1.
315
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, paras. 37–38, 43 (June 21, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=
req&dir&occ=first&part=1&cid=848112.
316
Id. at para. 38.
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from creating a presumption for similar facts in future cases?317 To this, the
ECJ answered that there can be no presumptions when the medical literature is
equivocal on a potential link.318
The Court of Cassation’s third question, which the ECJ did not reach, was
whether a scientific consensus must exist about a causal relationship between a
vaccine and a specific injury for a plaintiff to be able to win.319 The ECJ
effectively answered this question, though, finding that a medical consensus is
not necessary to rule in favor of the plaintiff when other compelling evidence
is present.320
The ECJ discussed the requirements of the Directive’s Article 6(1), which
considers a product
defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is
entitled to expect, taking all the circumstances into account,
including:
(a) the presentation of the product;
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product
would be put;
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation.321

Furthermore, a court’s assessment must take account of the “reasonable
expectations of the public at large.”322
The ECJ noted that if the only method of proof a plaintiff can rely on is
medical research, it would be “excessively difficult” or “impossible to
establish producer liability,” and would undermine the Directive’s core
principle of corporate liability.323 The ECJ also noted that if it were to set a
317

Id. at para. 17; Case C-621/15, W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 13 (Mar. 7, 2017),

http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188628&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1.
318
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 55 (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/
ocument/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=first&part=1&
cid=848112.
319
Id. at paras. 17, 56; Case C-621/15, W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 13 (Mar. 7, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188628&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1.
320
Case C-621/15, N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, para. 43 (June 21, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text&docid=192054&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir&occ=first&p
art=1&cid=848112.
321
Id. at para. 6 (quoting Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 28, 31 (EC)).
322
Id. at para. 23.
323
Id. at para. 31.
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threshold, requiring a scientific consensus or definitive medical proof, the “fair
apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production
between the injured person and the producer” sought by the Directive would
not be attainable.324
Thus the ECJ instructs national courts that to find in favor of a plaintiff,
they must find the plaintiff’s evidence “sufficiently serious, specific and
consistent to warrant the conclusion that . . . a defect in the product appears to
be the most plausible explanation for the occurrence of the damage, with the
result that the defect and the causal link may reasonably be considered to be
established.”325 While the ECJ does not decide the underlying disputes of the
cases referred to it—the national courts have to resolve them—it did opine in
this case that the timing between the hepatitis B vaccines and the onset of
multiple sclerosis, the lack of family history, and the significant number of
reported cases of disease-onset following such vaccinations, “appears on the
face of it to constitute evidence which . . . may lead a national court to consider
that a victim has discharged his burden of proof under Article 4 of Directive
85/374.”326
The ECJ goes on to say that this could be a case where “the vaccine is the
most plausible explanation” for the disease onset and where, under Article 6,
the product “causes abnormal and particularly serious damage to the patient
who, in the light of the nature and function of the product, is entitled to expect
a particularly high level of safety.”327 But the ECJ cautions that national courts
must reach such decisions “in a fully enlightened manner in each specific
case,” making it clear that such cases are extremely fact-specific and require
careful case-by-case consideration.328
The ECJ opposed any irrebuttable or absolute presumptions, however.329 It
argued that the use of such presumptions would undermine Article 4 and
would “risk compromising the very effectiveness of the system of liability”
that the Directive introduced.330 National courts may not use evidentiary rules
based on presumptions when there is no scientific consensus of causal link.

324
325
326
327
328
329
330

Id. at para. 32.
Id. at para. 37.
Id. at para. 41.
Id.
Id. at para. 42.
Id. at para. 53.
Id.
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B. Commentary on the ECJ Decision
The Associated Press (AP), CNN, and other media outlets immediately
attacked the ECJ’s decision, with headlines like the AP’s “EU Court: Vaccines
Can Be Blamed for Illnesses Without Proof.”331 The AP story quoted Dr. Paul
Offit, a leading U.S. vaccine proponent, who said, “Using those criteria, you
could reasonably make the case that someone should be compensated for
developing leukemia after eating a peanut butter sandwich.”332 He suggested
further that courts cannot be trusted to make such decisions: “To prove
whether one thing causes another has to happen in a scientific venue, and the
courts are not a scientific venue.”333 He went on to say that the court’s
judgment created a “ridiculously low bar for causality.”334
Laurie Garrett, a prominent journalist covering vaccines and their role in
global epidemics,335 wrote an article entitled, “Science Won’t Save Vaccines
from Lawsuits Anymore: Europe’s Highest Court Has Just Cleared the Way
for Vaccine-Truthers to Sue Manufacturers, Even Without Any Evidence.”336
She wrote that the decision comes at a “fragile time for the international
vaccine regime,” when it is “under assault . . . by a growing culture of antiscientific paranoia.”337 Inaccurately, she suggested, “If there was a burden to
prove, or disprove, such a link [between a vaccine defect and disease onset], it

331
Associated Press, EU Court: Vaccines Can Be Blamed for Illnesses Without Proof, CBS NEWS (June
21, 2017, 10:27 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/eu-court-vaccines-can-be-blamed-for-illnesses-withoutproof/.
332
Id. For more on Dr. Offit’s role as a vaccine proponent, see, for example, Paul A. Offit, M.D., CHILD.
HOSP. PHIL., http://www.chop.edu/doctors/offit-paul-a (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) (“Dr. Offit is an
internationally recognized expert in the fields of virology and immunology, and was a member of the Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.”). For information
about Dr. Offit’s potential financial conflicts of interest regarding vaccines, see Millions of Children Infected
with “Vaccine Safety Experts” Rotateq Vaccine: Dr. Paul Offit, GREENMEDINFO (Sept. 25, 2014, 5:15 PM),
http://www.greenmedinfo.com/blog/breaking-news-millions-children-infected-vaccine-safety-experts-rotateqvaccine (alleging a conflict of interest between Dr. Offit’s role promoting vaccines and the fact that he coinvented a rotavirus vaccine, from which he derived substantial income). The AP article cited here does not
mention any financial conflicts of interest.
333
Associated Press, supra note 331.
334
Id.
335
See About, LAURIE GARRETT, http://lauriegarrett.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); VaccinePreventable Outbreaks Map, LAURIE GARRETT, http://lauriegarrett.com/vaccine-preventable-outbreaksinteractive-map/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
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POL’Y (June 26, 2017, 12:56 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/26/science-wont-save-vaccines-fromlawsuits-anymore/.
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would be placed on the defendants. Voila! Science be damned.”338 She
continued that “crackpot theories” of vaccine injury now “can be presented in a
European court of law, absent the merest modicum of evidence.”339
Other scientific and legal commentators have been more balanced. The
scientific journal Nature ran the headline “Vaccine Ruling from Europe’s
Highest Court Isn’t as Crazy as Scientists Think: Media and Scientific Uproar
over Admissible Evidence ‘Exaggerated’, Say Legal Scholars.”340 The authors
quote Alex Stein, an expert in civil liability law and medical evidence, as
saying “credible medical evidence showing that the vaccine is safe will win the
case . . . . Those who say that the ECJ decision has opened a floodgate for
multiple vaccine liability suits are therefore mistaken.”341
Stein stated that defendants will ensure that courts hear the most
compelling medical evidence in their favor.342 He argues that the ECJ has not
lowered the bar for claims; it merely has allowed courts “to admit whatever
relevant evidence they wish and judge it on its own merits along with the
rest.”343 The authors also quote Joasia Luzak, an expert in consumer law,
saying that “[t]he judgment is measured.”344 In her view, the ruling makes
clear that courts must “reject spurious and weak evidence.”345
Prominent vaccine proponent and legal scholar Dorit Reiss346 also wrote a
nuanced assessment of the ECJ’s decision, arguing that the decision does not
say “courts can ignore science.”347 On the contrary, she argued, the ECJ held
that when there is no clear medical evidence for or against causation, the
plaintiff does not automatically lose because she does not have definite
scientific evidence.348
338
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https://www.nature.com/news/vaccine-ruling-from-europe-s-highest-court-isn-t-as-crazy-as-scientists-think1.22222.
341
Id.
342
Id.
343
Id.
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, U.C. HASTINGS C.L. S.F., http://www.uchastings.edu/faculty/reiss/ (last
visited Dec. 21, 2017); Law and Vaccines: List of Dorit Reiss’ Blog Posts and Articles, U.C. HASTINGS C.L.
S.F., http://sites.uchastings.edu/lawandvaccines/ (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) (arguing against non-medical
exemptions and for tort liability for failure to vaccinate).
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Reiss points out that this is a more favorable standard for plaintiffs than the
U.S. standard in which plaintiffs must present evidence that meets a scientific
threshold.349 In U.S. courts, judges serve as gatekeepers to assess experts and
evidence under the Daubert standard.350 A judge may only permit the jury to
hear credible scientific evidence, which usually means that the peer review
process has confirmed the scientific information and that the information is
based on standard scientific methodologies.351Reiss affirms that the ECJ’s
more favorable standard for plaintiffs is reasonable under principles of product
liability, which recognize the substantial power imbalance between
manufacturers and consumers, tilting steeply in the manufacturer’s favor.352
The ECJ decision, she opines, “is not a blank check to blame vaccines for
any problem.”353 She sees no better alternative, however, than that a court
makes the decision on vaccine injury compensation.354 “The court has to
balance individual justice with absolute truth. Rules like the French causation
rule are a way to try and do that.”355 She concludes that “it’s not unreasonable
to place the burden of scientific uncertainty, when there are other factors that
can support causation, on large manufacturers over consumers.”356
The ECJ decision affirms an individual’s right to sue vaccine
manufacturers for harms that she reasonably could not have expected based on
the product warnings and on the “particularly high level of safety” she is
entitled to expect for vaccines.357
This decision permits lawsuits in Europe for defectively designed vaccines
that individuals cannot bring in any court in the United States. There are
several vaccines on the global market now, including pentavalent and
hexavalent infant vaccines and human papilloma virus vaccines for teenagers,
which appear to be associated with significant injuries and deaths, despite the
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lack of clear scientific consensus of a causal link.358 N.W. v. Sanofi Pasteur
MSD SNC may permit more vaccine injury litigation in Europe, which in turn
could improve vaccine safety globally. Because many of the vaccines on the
market in Europe are identical to those marketed elsewhere and produced by
the same handful of manufacturers,359 if litigation induces manufacturers to
change their product designs for the European market, they might implement
those changes elsewhere in the world.
III. THE COALITION FOR EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS INNOVATIONS
In January 2017, a number of international public and private actors
formed a new global institution, the CEPI, to help create vaccines for emerging
epidemic threats, particularly in the developing world.360 The governments of
Germany, Japan, and Norway, together with the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation and the Wellcome Trust, made initial investments of $540
million;361 the European Commission has pledged 250 million euros.362 India is
expected to donate as well.363 Several vaccine manufacturers, including
GlaxoSmithKine, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Pfizer, Sanofi Pasteur, and
Takeda, became CEPI partners rather than donors, as did the intergovernmental WHO and non-profit Doctors Without Borders.364 CEPI’s
partners announced this new effort at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland in early 2016.365
358
See, e.g., Jacob Puliyel & C. Sathyamala, Comment, Infanrix Hexa and Sudden Death: A Review of
the Periodic Safety Update Reports Submitted to the European Medicines Agency, INDIAN J. MED. ETHICS
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2017),
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CEPI
Officially
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The 2014 Ebola epidemic in West Africa that killed 11,000 people spurred
the creation of this public-private partnership.366 The global public health
community perceived that its response to the Ebola epidemic was
inadequate.367 Although vaccines against Ebola were developed, they were
available only after the epidemic was waning and many thousands had already
died.368 CEPI aims to create a new infrastructure that will ensure greater global
preparedness for future pandemics by developing and stockpiling the vaccines
most likely to be useful.369
The first three vaccines CEPI plans to develop are for MERS, Lassa, and
Nipah viruses, which are on the WHO’s list of priority pathogens.370 These
infectious diseases primarily affect the developing world, and the marketplace
on its own likely would not develop vaccines against these diseases quickly.371
CEPI takes a comprehensive approach, ensuring support for vaccine candidates
through late preclinical studies and will support vaccine technologies that
enable rapid development.372 CEPI’s scientific advisory committee chose these
three diseases based on potential for public health impact, risk of outbreak, and
feasibility of vaccine development.373 CEPI also plans to sponsor research into
a new class of vaccines, known as RNA vaccines, to allow much faster
development.374
CEPI also notes that it will collaborate with WHO objectives, including
“[d]evelopment and implementation of new norms and standards adapted to
and appropriate for an epidemic context.”375 While this statement is vague, it

366

Id.
See id.
368
Approach, CEPI, http://cepi.net/approach (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) (“Recent epidemics and
pandemics have exposed serious flaws in the world’s capacity to prepare for and respond to infectious disease
outbreaks. The Ebola outbreak in West Africa and Zika in the Americas are the most recent instances.”).
369
Id.
370
Resources, CEPI, http://cepi.net/resources#Priority-diseases (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).
371
See CEPI, A GLOBAL INSURANCE POLICY TO DEFEND AGAINST FUTURE EPIDEMICS, http://cepi.net/
sites/default/files/CEPI%20booklet%20final_0.pdf (“Mission: To stimulate, finance and co-ordinate vaccine
development against diseases with epidemic potential in cases where market incentives fail.”).
372
Id.
373
Resources, supra note 370.
374
Yong, supra note 360 (“The beauty of these RNA vaccines is that once you develop a way of
delivering the RNA into a patient—some kind of scaffold or shell—you can theoretically customize it to deal
with all kinds of diseases. Just swap the Ebola RNA for that of some other virus, and you’d have a new
vaccine in a matter of weeks. And if you could show that the scaffold is safe, no matter whose RNA it carries,
then you could speed that new vaccine through the regulatory process.”).
375
John-Arne Røttingen, Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI): Presentation to the
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appears from news reports that the CEPI board is exploring different models
for manufacturer liability protection and victim compensation.376 A
PowerPoint on the WHO website notes that CEPI must create “market
security,” comprised of “positive externalities,” “minimal disruptions,” and
“market predictability.”377 Furthermore, CEPI declares that it “will rely on
WHO as the global normative lead agency on health.”378
Dr. Jeremy Farrar, director of Wellcome Trust and a CEPI board member,
said to the New York Times that CEPI favors the U.S. NVICP model, under
which vaccine makers cannot be sued directly, but must contribute money they
collect as excise taxes from consumers to a fund that compensates those
injured.379 But Andrew P. Witty, chairman of GlaxoSmithKline, said that
industry preferred protection along the lines of the PREP Act, “which exempts
vaccine makers from all liability—except for willful misconduct—once the
[Secretary of HHS has] declare[d] a public health emergency.”380
CONCLUSION
Given the well-documented problems with both the Vaccine Act and PREP
Act regimes discussed above, it would be unfortunate to see CEPI
unquestioningly embrace these models and export them to the developing
world. Neither model has performed well. The NVICP has not functioned as
Congress intended, and many question the constitutionality of the PREP Act as
well as its effectiveness.
The recent ECJ decision strikes a more judicious balance, allowing
individuals to bring claims for defective vaccines to court. If CEPI is to inspire
vaccine confidence in emergency situations in developing countries, it would
be well-advised to ensure some access to courts in cases of injury. If CEPI fails
to do this, vaccines may be less safe than they could be, and, as a result, people
will inevitably lose confidence both in vaccines and in those recommending
them.
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